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basis for these figures. This is the ratio of uncertainty controlled by the
independent variable, termed "transmitted information" by Shannon,
to the uncertainty in the dependent variable, again measured by the
usual logarithmic information measure. T~is measure was chosen
because it is identical in structure and meaning to the other measures
used in this paper and applying it to normally distributed equal interval
scales would produce results identical to an analysis of variance. For
further information consult: McGill, W. J. "Isomorphism in Statistical
Analysis" and G. A. Miller, "Note on the Bias of Information
Measures," both in Quastler, H. (ed.) Information Theory in Psycho-
logy. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1955; and also Senders, V.
Measurement and Statistics. N.Y.: The Oxford University Press, 1958,
pp.89-98.
b These figures are based on unbiased estimators of the variance in the
dependent variable attributable to the independent variable and to the
total variance of the dependent variable. These estimators were derived
from what is called "components of variance analysis." The percentages
are simply the ratio of these two terms. The best introduction to this
ratio is given by Haggard in his book on lntraclass Correlation and the
Analysis of Variance. N.Y.: The Dryden Press, 1958.
C These figures are based on biased estimators of the variance in the
dependent variable which is attributable to the independent variable
and the total variance in the dependent variable. The ratio of these
variances is given by the square of the correlation coefficient.
Unfortunately, unbiased estimates could not be derived from the
information made available in the articles. However, they may also be
derived from component of variance analysis. This is discussed in





The use of Verstehen in sociology has had a checkered history.
Indeed one might think that the "operation called Verstehen" had been
laid to rest twenty years ago by an oft-cited article of that title by
Theodore Abel. (1) Abel concludes that Verstehen has to do with
relating the behavior of others to "our personal experiences". (1, 685)
Accordingly:
Primarily the operation of Verstehen does two things: It relieves us
of a sense of apprehension in connection with behavior that is
unfamiliar or unexpected and it is a source of "hunches" which can
help us in the formulation of hypotheses. (1, 687) ,
Professor Ernest Nagel, at the conclusion of a discussion of "meaning-
ful" explanations of human behavior, concludes that:
TABLE II THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RISK AND STATIS-
TICAL DETERMINANCY FOR RELATIONSHIPS SIGNI-





















(The social scientist's) ability tu enter into relations of empathy with
the human actors in some social process may indeed be heuristically
important in his efforts to invent suitable hypotheses which will
explain the process. Nevertheless, his empathetic identification with
these individuals does not, by itself, constitute knowledge. (2, 484)
~ofessor Murr~y Wax has defended the use of Verstehen in sociology
In a recent artlcle, Wax argues that Abel's criticisms are misguided
because Abel has misunderstood what Verstehen is. According to Wax:
Following the the~retical lead of Weber (cited above), he (Abel)
places the emphasis (of Verstehen) upon the imputation of motive
which, and here he is quite correct, he sees as a difficulty in this kind
of case, but he misses the point that the true level of Verstehen
involved here is far deeper and more primitive. (3, 326)
Not only does the "real" Verstehen not involve imputation of motive
but, according to Wax, it also does not involve "interpersonai
intuition". (3, 330-331) Waxgoes on:
Cooley, Weber, and others in their theoretical discussions have
regarded Verstehen as if it did represent a kind of knowing or
understanding which one individual might have of another (and to be
differentiated from the kind of knowing the scientist might gain of
the atom). (Wax, 331)
I am not quite certain just exactly what Professor Wax would say to
this "different kind of knowing". Either he holds that there is no such
"different kind of knowing" or that this "different kind of knowing"
can only be understood in. a cultural context (whatever that means).
But exactly where Professor Wax stands on this point is not
important for my purposes. For I want to make a prima facie case in
this paper for the following theses. I wish to suggest that Abel is simply
wrong about the scientific dispensibility of Verstehen as a component
of our knowledge of human behavior. And I wish to suggest further
that those interpretations of Verstehen which Professor Wax rejects as
"misunderstandings" are precisely those kinds of Verstehen which are
not dispensible in the explanations that we do giveof human action.
Part I
It is worth noting at the outset that there is 'something very queer
about the "misunderstanding" which Wax attributes to Abel. In the
first place the sociologist who is most clearly associated with the
doctrine of Verstehen (at least in my mind) is Max Weber. Nor do I
think it any accident that Wax refers to Weber in his article concerning
Verstehen more often than to any other sociologist. Yet, if one
examines the introductory pages of Weber's Wirtschaft und Gesell-
sehaft, one notes that Webe'r categorizes Verstehen into aktuelles
Verstehen and erkliirendes Verstehen. (4, 94-95) And if one notes how
aktuelles Verstehen and erkliirendes Verstehen are characterized, one
notes that the latter sort has to do with the understanding of motives
and that the former has to do with direct interpersonal understanding
of ideas or emotions. And one notes further that Weber himself makes
no attempt when explaining these notions to stipulate that they must
be put into their cultural context.
Now, of course, Professor Wax is at least partially, not wholly aware,
of all of this. Yet Professor Wax dismisses Weber's theoretical concerns,
in Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft with the notion of Verstehen:
If we turn for elucidation to Weber, whose essays on the Protestant
ethic constitute one of the finest examples of verstehende historical
sociology, we find theoretical concerns which have but little relation
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to the actual methodology of that aspect of this most famous of his
works. . .. Little would be gained by following further in this
social-psychological path or by adding further to the exegetical
literature on Weber. (3, 324)
Later, Professor Wax chooses to contrast Abel's understanding of
Verstehen and Weber's understanding of Verstehen qua sociological
methodologist with what Wax terms "real Verstehen" and "the true
level of Verstehen". (3, 326) From all of this one must judge that
Professor Wax wishes to reject Weber's characterization of Verstehen.
But why? Surely not on the grounds that Weber has inadequately
characterized Verstehen. One would think that Weber's position in the
history of sociology and, in particular, his role in the literature on
Verstehen is such that Verstehen just is whatever Weber says it is. I
rather think that the basis on which Professor Wax wishes to dismiss
Weber in characterization of Verstehen is that Professor Wax believes
that the methodology which Weber advocates in Wirtschaft und
Gesellschaft is just incorrect. Presumably Professor Wax would like to
save the word 'Verstehen' for some methodological principles which are
nearer the truth.
Nevertheless, one cannot cut much methodological ice by revising
the meanings of terms in the discipline of sociological methodology.
Furthermore, even though the word 'Verstehen' is often used in such a
way that its meaning is obscure, to say the least, it seems to me that
Weber's theoretical remarks on Verstehen methodology in the introduc-
tory pages of Wirtschaft· und Gesellschaft make for some of the most
penetrating points about the methodology of the explanation of human
behavior that I have ever read. Accordingly, I wish to defend Weber's
conception of Verstehen in spite of the callous treatment of that
conception at the hands of both Abel and Wax.
Part II
Due to the limits of this paper such a defense must necessarily be
sketchy. First, I shall address myself to the question of whether there is
a kind of knowing or understanding which one individualmight have of
another which is different from the understanding we have of inorganic
phenomena.
Weber claimed there was such a different kind of knowing and when
he explained his claim, he gave two examples. We use aktuelles
Verstehen, he says, to understand the meaning of '2 x 2 = 4' when we
read it or see it. This Webercalled 'rational understanding'. (4, 94) And
Weber contrasted this with understanding an outbreak of anger. This
was another species of the genus aktuelles Verstehen. (4, 95)
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Now is this kind of understanding different from an understanding of
non-organic phenomena? It seems to me it plainly is and I wish to
explain why.
It seems clear that, in ordinary cases, when we say of someone else,
that we know what they are thinking, we literally have the same
thoughts as that other person. And less often, when we say to someone
that we know what they are feeling, we actually have the same feelings.
On the other hand, I do not understand the motion of Mars around the
sun by literally tracing that orbit. I know very well what it is like to
understand what that orbit is without tracing it. I do not know what it
would be like to understand why a colleague holds a certain
philosophical view without being in exactly the same state of mind in
all relevant respects as my colleague when he thought of the arguments
in virtue of which he holds that view. To the extent then that the study
of human behavior is the study of human thought - and to a large
extent then that the study of human behavior is exactly that - one
epistemological situation with respect to humans is radically different
from our situation with respect to atoms. The properties of atoms can
never become properties of my knowing self; but the properties of
other knowing and feeling selves can become properties of my knowing,
feeling self. This has two consequences. On the one hand, humans have
a fantastic cognitive advantage in the study of other people which they
do not have when they study things unlike them. On the other hand,
the thoughts of which knowledge consists are often in the case of
knowledge of human actions, literally the same as what that knowledge
is of This is never the case in physics.
This point seems to me so obvious that I sometimes wonder why it is
so often overlooked. I think there is one possible explanation. The
history of positivism is the history of the confusion of meaning with
evidence. If one projects this confusion on to the advocate of
Verstehen, one can then represent him as advocating a method of
verification of what other people are thinking by means of thinking the
thoughts we presume to be in their minds. Now this, of course, is
absurd. But Weber's aktuelles Verstehen is concerned with the nature of
the knowledge we have of others, not with that evidence, in virtue of
which we are entitled to say that we know. (4, 97-98)
Part III
Now I wish to turn to a defense of Weber's most interesting
erkliirendes Verstehen. Understanding of motivation according to
Weber consists in placing human action "in an intelligible and more
inclusive context of meaning". (4, 95) What is this supposed to signify?
Erkliirendes Verstehen Weber maintains, consists of placing an action






aware and to which their actions have been oriented". (4, 93) And to
do this is to understand actions in terms of motives. Talcott Parsons'
comment on this is instructive. Parsons interprets Weber as maintaining
that the "meaningful interpretation" of an action can be understood
"only in terms such as those of a rational means-end schema". (4, 93) I
would agree with Parsons that this is Weber's position. I would disagree
with him that it is too narrow. At any rate the position I wish to defend
is this. I wish to defend the claim that to fit an action into a rational
means-end schema is ordinarily what understanding an action amounts
to. I also happen to think that fitting an action into such a schema is
the only proper way of understanding that action. But I don't propose
to defend the latter claim. Defense of the former is sufficient to
vindicate Weber.
Now what is involved in fitting an action into a rational means-end
schema? What is involved can I think, be understood by considering a
very simple example. Suppose that Jones has just walked down to the
basement of Strong Hall. We ask for an explanation of that action. We
get the explanation that Jones wanted a cup of coffee. Now there is a
fairly simple-minded way in which such an explanation seems to fit into
a rational means-end schema. Jones had the desire for a cup of coffee.
One of the means of getting a cup of coffee if one works in Strong Hall
and one does not care much about the quality of one's coffee or if one
is overcome by the desire to drink coffee no matter what it tastes like,
is to go down to the coffee machine in the basement and purchase a
cup. Such an action is goal-oriented. And we would ordinarily treat it as
rational. But the sense in which it is rational requires a close look.
Now I need a little technical vocabulary in order to make the points I
wish to make. Let us call the claim 'Jones went down to the basement
of Strong Hall' the explanandum (to borrow a term from Hempel). And
let us call the claim 'Jones wanteti a cup of coffee' the explainer. I wish
to defend the claim that these two claims do in fact stand in the
relation of explainer to explanandum, that' the one claim, in other
words, does indeed explain the other, because the two claims are indeed
connected together in a rational means-end schema. That this is so,
according to Weber, is for there to be a meaningfully adequate level of
understanding of the phenomenon in question.
An adequate defense of the claim which I wish to make consists, I
think, in showing that the standard alternative account of what is going
on here is dispensible. The standard alternative, positivist, account is
that the explainer does indeed explain the explanandum if, and only if,
there is some universal law, or statistical generalization of some sort
which does indeed connect the explanandum with the explainer. And
the reason one requires such laws, is, according to the positivist, that
the explainer and the explanandum are distinct claims: the one does
not entail the other, but in order for the one to explain the other, they
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must be connected in some way. According to the positivist, there are
only two legitimate ways in which they can be connected. They may be
causally connected. And to say that they are causally connected is to
say according to the positivist that they are connected by some sort of
universal law. Or they may be connected in a way such that the
occurrence of the explainer event would even in conjunction with
probabilistic generalizations, be such as to give a reasonable main
grounds to expect the occurrence of the explanandum.
Now it does seem to me that the connection which the positivist
alleges to exist between the explainer and the explanandum is quite
dispensible in a case such as one simple example. I do not mean to
claim that there are no laws or statistical correlations which relate to
the explainer and the explanandum. There may be for all I know. What
I do wish to claim is that we do not have to know that we have an
explanation. All we have to know, I contend, is that this explanation
exemplifies Weber's erhliirendes Verstehen and that this explanation is
an explanation in virtue of exemplifying Weber's erhliirendes Verstehen.
If so, then we have vindicated Weber.
Now let us take another look at our simple example. We may say
that the claim 'Jones wanted a cup of coffee' explains the claim 'Jones
went. down to the basement of Strong Hal!'. Now I don't think that
there is anything crucial about the formal mode. here. We could say as
well that the event, Jones wanting a cup of coffee, explains the event,
Jones going down to the basement of Strong Hall. To say that is to say
that the events or claims are connected in such a way that the one
explains the other. Now the move by the positivist is to search for a law
or generalization which is either strictly universal or probabilistic which
connects the two events. But one possible move by the Verstehen
theorist ought to be evident here. He might argue that going down to
the basement is a means of obtaining a cup of coffee. To do such a
thing is a rational thing to do if one wants a cup of coffee.
But if the Verstehen theorist does give this sort of analysis of the
connection obtaining here between the explainer and the explanandum,
then he is playing into the positivists' hands. For the positivist will
point out that the claim 'Going down to the basement is a means of
getting a cup of coffee' is really a causal claim of a rather complicated
sort and is true in virtue of there being certain generalizations which
correlate going to the basement of Strong Hall and getting a cup of
coffee.
Some philosophers might regard it as a philosophical first principle
that one should never play into the hands of the positivists. But I think
that there are even better reasons why the Verstehen theorist should
not give this sort of analysis of the connection between the explainer
and the explanandum. For if the Verstehen theorist does give this sort
of analysis, then he will have difficulty explaining action in which the
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I connection between the explainer and the explanandum is based on a
false belief on the part of the agent about the relation between means
and ends. If Jones is doing a snake dance in order to exorcize demons
from the spirits of the departed, then he is performing an action (the
snake dance) for an end (exorcizing demons) and he is performing that
action because (as he sees it) the action is a means to the end he wishes
to achieve.
Now if the Verstehen theorist wants a theory of explanation which
will handle both of the examples which we have considered, then he
ought to analyze the connection between the explainer and the
explanandum in a way such that he does not play into the hands of the
positivist. This can be accomplished in the following manner. The
Verstehen theorist can maintain that the connection between the
explainer and the explanandum is (in the coffee case) Jones' belief that
a way of exorcizing demons from the spirits of the departed is to do
snake dances. And the claim of the form 'Jones believes P' is a
particular claim about (roughly) Jones' state of mind at some particular
time. It is not even covertly a general proposition. Accordingly suchan
analysis is quite incompatible with the positivist analysis.
If this account of the explanatory connection in these cases is
correct, then it is the subjective meaning of an action for Jones (this is
to say, Jones' belief about the pattern of meaning into which the action
is fitted) which is logically indispensible for understanding the action.
For we must think the same thought that Jones believes in order to
understand Jones' action in either of these cases. To do this is to
understand that this action was rational given Jones' desires and his
beliefs. For if we do understand this, we will not think the connection
between the explainer and the explanandum, and if we do not think the
connection between the explainer and the explanandum, we do not
think those claims as explainers and explananda at all. For to explain in
these cases is in part to understand a connection. And to grasp that sort
of connection is to grasp the subjective meaning of the action for the
actor. And that is precisely what Weber is advocating.
Now it is, I suppose, logically possible at least that a positivist still
might argue that we really don't understand an explanation as an
explanation unless we understand the connection in terms of some
general proposition. But it is easy to see that the positivist claim is false.
For we understood the samples I gave of explanations without having
any ideas of the generalizations (if any) which do indeed underlie them.
We can understand why Jones is doing a snake dance without having
any idea whether the belief about the relationship between doing snake
dances and exorcizing demons is a belief of Jones' tribe, of his village,
of his family, or a temporary idiosyncratic belief of Jones alone. Since
we see that such an example of explanation is an example of
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explanation without knowledge of the positivists' generalization, the
generalizations are dispensible. . . .
Now what I have done (I am afraid all too briefly) IS this, I have
offered two examples of explanation which plainly do exemplify a type
of explanation of human action which is very, very common, I.ha~e
argued that the positivist analysis of those examples of explanation IS
inadequate. This strongly suggests that the positivist analysis of any
explanations of this type is inadequate. Furthe~mor~, I .have~gued that
the analysis of these examples of explanation IS, In all Important
respects just what erhliirendes Verstehen amounts to for Weber. But I
said that I wished to do more than this. I said I wished to argue that
erkliirendes Verstehen was a correct analysis of explanations of this
general type. . . ..
Now Weber's analysis does have, I think, a great deal of intuitive
plausibility. A defense of this analysis amoun~ to a defense of t~e
objections which might be made against it. I think there are two main
types of objections which might be raised.
First of all, one might argue that, say, in the case of going to get a
cup of coffee, it could be the case that Jones wanted a CUp of coffee,
that Jones believed that a way of obtaining that cup was to go to the
basement of Strong Hall and that Jones did go to the basement, but
that the explanation of Jones going to the basement of Strong Hall is
that he wished to see someone in the history department. And this is
correct. It is indeed the case that the truth of the three propositions I
have cited does not guarantee the correctness of the explanation. The
reason for this is that although the truth of the three propositions do
guarantee the claim that Jones wanting a cup of coffee is a possi~le
cause of his going to the basement, they do not guarantee the claim
that it is the cause. This is, of course, generally the case. If we know
that someone performs action X, and we know that he believes that
performance of X is a means to Y, and he does desire Y, it may still be
the case that he performs action X in order to achieve Z. Accordingly, I
have not given a complete account of an explanation type, so far. And
this is true. For in order to state with assurance that Y was the cause of
X, we have to be able to rule out other possible causes of X. To do this
is to find out that there were no other reasons for that person to do X
and that he was not forced to do X. But finding this out involves no
more than checking further into that person's beliefs. The operation of
Verstehen provides us with a way of discovering possible causes. The
rest is elimination of certain possibilities or in the C8$e of graphs, the
use of statistics.
The second possible line of objection is that this Verstehen analysis
sanctions a "subjective" rather than an "objective" treatment of the
evidence for a person having certain beliefs or having certain motives
and that Verstehen is, therefore, somehow unscientific. But nothing
86
could be further from the truth. The Verstehen analysis of the
explanation of a human action is perfectly compatible with standard
objective tests for what a person believes. The Verstehen theorist does
not have to hold that the criterion of truth for the propositions which
are component parts of an explanation is intuition. What he does hold
is that, in standard sorts of cases, that in virtue of which a purported
explanation of an action which consists of true propositions is indeed
an explanation is our ability to think of that action as a rational action
from the point of view of the agent whose action is being explained.
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